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Abstract
Current literature views the punishment of free-riders as an under-supplied pub-
lic good, carried out by individuals at a cost to themselves. It need not be so:
often, free-riders’ property can be forcibly appropriated by a coordinated group.
This power makes punishment profitable, but it can also be abused. It is easier
to contain abuses, and focus group punishment on free-riders, in societies where
coordinated expropriation is harder. Our theory explains why public goods are un-
dersupplied in heterogenous communities: because groups target minorities instead
of free-riders. In our laboratory experiment, outcomes were more e cient when
coordination was more di cult, while outgroup members were targeted more than
ingroup members, and reacted di erently to punishment.
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1 Introduction
Deterring free-riding is a central element of social order. Most students of collective action
believe that punishing free-riders is costly to the punisher, but benefits the community
as a whole. Thus, punishment is itself a collective good, and so providing punishment
means solving a second-order collective action problem (henceforth SOCAP). A society’s
primary task is to solve the SOCAP, and thus deter free-riding.1
We question this view. Punishing free-riders need not be costly. For, when enough
people coordinate to punish somebody, the risks for the punishers are small, and they
may benefit materially by forcibly appropriating a fraction of their victim’s income or
economic assets (“expropriation” for short). In these cases, punishment is individually
rational for the punishers and the threat of punishment is credible. Sanctioning free-riders
is simply a matter of coordination.
Because coordinated expropriation can be profitable, it may be used to target free-
riders, but it may also be used opportunistically. Thus, expropriation threatens a second
element of social order, namely secure property rights. Unusual, unpopular or vulnerable
people may be falsely identified as free-riders and targeted. Furthermore, the threat of
expropriation can make individuals unwilling to take risks or stand out, for example by
individual enterprise (Platteau, 1996). By focusing on individual free-riding and ignoring
collective expropriation, social scientists have misread the problems of self-governing com-
munities. To achieve e cient outcomes societies must both punish individual free-riders,
and prevent abusive expropriation.
We present a simple theory of group expropriation (a.k.a. confiscation, dispossession,
disseizure, taking, or theft), and show how the possibility of profitable expropriation of
individuals by coordinated groups can a ect public goods provision. A key feature of the
technology is the ease of expropriation, modeled as the minimum number of targeters
that is required to successfully expropriate a victim. When a small group can do this,
then coordination failures are less likely, and expropriation is more profitable, because
the loot is shared among fewer people. This is true whether expropriation is targeted on
free-riders or not. Ease of expropriation thus makes it easier to punish free-riders but also
easier to target anyone else, and can therefore either help or harm e ciency. However,
if coordination sometimes fails, and if free-riders are a salient target for expropriation,
then there is a “sweet spot” where only free-riders are expropriated, both free-riding and
expropriation are avoided along the equilibrium path, and outcomes are e cient. When
expropriation is harder than this, it becomes impossible and free-riding occurs. When it
1Ostrom (1990) describes the “general problem” of common pool resource situations as “how to orga-
nize to avoid the adverse outcomes of independent action [our italics]” (p. 29) and argues “[s]ubstantial
benefits have to be obtained to make costly monitoring and sanctioning activities worthwhile” (p. 36).
See also Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970); Oliver (1980); Yamagishi (1986).
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gets easier, ine cient equilibria arise; in the extreme case, there is a Hobbesian anarchy,
and outcomes are the worst possible.
Coordinated expropriation can explain why ethnically diverse communities may be
less successful at providing public goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999, Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2000, Easterly 2001b). Visible minorities may provide a convenient target to
coordinate on. If a group targets ethnic minorities, this abuse leaves free-riders unpun-
ished. We illustrate these points with historical evidence from the mining camps of the
California Gold Rush, a test case where technologies made expropriation easy, amidst a
very ethnically diverse population.
Lastly, we test the theory’s predictions in a laboratory experiment: a public goods
game, followed by a game of group expropriation. Treatments vary the ease of expropria-
tion, and group diversity. In treatments where expropriation requires no coordination, we
see both more expropriation and also more free-riding. “Minority” subjects, identified by
a trivial observable di erence from others in their group, are more likely to be targeted
than others, and react di erently to being dispossessed.
Section 2 outlines our arguments and discusses links with existing literature. Section 3
presents the theoretical model. Section 4 discusses group heterogeneity. Section 5 details
our experiments. Section 6 concludes.
2 Group expropriation and the provision of punish-
ment
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970) developed the idea of the SOCAP in response to Olson’s
(1965) statement of the problem of collective action.
[T]he mechanism o ered by some economists to explain the supply of col-
lective goods does not represent a su cient explanation [...] Suppose that a
tax is collected through coercion. What is to prevent those who collect the
tax from absconding with the proceeds? Any mechanism for insuring that
revenues so collected are turned toward the supply of collective goods would
itself be a costly collective good. (p. 120)
Oliver (1980) analyzed the problem formally and pointed out that the expected cost of
punishment falls with the proportion of free-riders, and may thus be zero in equilibrium.
The SOCAP has helped to motivate two highly influential literatures. The first draws
on the theory of repeated games. In an equilibrium of a repeated game, free-riding may be
“punished” by reciprocating free-riding during future play (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981;
Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). This idea has been taken up widely, beyond game theory,
in explaining how communities function. Key works include Coleman (1988), Ostrom
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(1990) and Ellickson (1994). The mechanism needs no special punishment motivations.
Instead, individuals must have a low discount rate, expect future interactions over an
indefinite horizon, and be informed about others’ past behavior. Applied work often
interprets this as requiring communities to have low levels of migration and plenty of
gossip (e.g. Coleman 1988,Ostrom 1990).
The second literature responds to the SOCAP by arguing that humans provide coer-
cion, despite its cost, because of an innate preference for punishing bad behavior. This
idea is supported by experimental evidence that people will pay to punish free-riders even
in one-shot games (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006). A
large body of theory characterizes costly punishment as an evolutionarily stable strategy,
often invoking Oliver’s mechanism (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Boyd et al., 2003; Nowak
and Sigmund, 2005). The experimental literature is even more extensive: Google Scholar
records about 3680 articles using the phrase “costly punishment” since 2000.
Recently, however, this idea has been criticized. Motivations for costly punishment
require strong conditions to evolve; costly punishment does not always increase e ciency
in laboratory public goods games (Dreber et al., 2008); and a review of the anthropolog-
ical literature shows that much free-riding is punished costlessly (Guala, 2012; see also
Boehm 2001, Wiessner 2005). Lastly, the work of Rand et al. (2014) raises questions
about the evidence for costly punishment motivations: costly punishment behaviour in
lab experiments may not reflect a social preference, but a “social heuristic”, carried over
from real-world settings.
Here, we reexamine the assumption behind this work: the existence of the SOCAP. We
start from three basic premises. Firstly, in many settings, individuals have expropriable
assets. Punishment may involve ine cient conflict, but if the winner can expropriate
(“disseize”, “confiscate”) assets or income from the loser, then the conflict may be ex ante
profitable to one side. Second, punishment need not be provided by individuals; instead
a group comprised of some or all other community members, can choose to target an
individual. In many kinds of conflict between an individual and a group, when group
size increases, the expected total harm to the group decreases, and the expected harm to
the individual increases;2 if so, a large enough group can cause harm to an individual at
minimal risk to its members. Third, expropriation by a group requires group members to
coordinate on a common target.
Under these conditions, groups will be able to expropriate individuals at a profit.
This does not guarantee that free-riders will be punished, but it makes punishment a
coordination problem, rather than a collective action problem. If some group can agree
2This follows from Lanchester’s (1916) “square law” for physical conflict between an individual and
a group. It is also consistent with the theory of e.g. trade wars, where larger countries or coalitions of
countries can experience a net gain from retaliation against a small country.
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on a strategy of targeting free-riders, free-riding will be deterred. But the group need not
only target free-riders. It can coordinate to target anyone, irrespective of their behavior.
Doing so profits the group, but subjects the community to ine ciencies from redistribution
and conflict (Tullock, 1967). Therefore, social e ciency requires balancing two risks: if
groups fail to coordinate, individual free-riding goes unpunished; if they coordinate in the
wrong way, the innocent are expropriated (and free-riding may still go unpunished).
Expropriation of individuals by groups, or by the majority, is widespread. Histor-
ical examples include witchcraft accusations in Europe and America (Horsley, 1979;
Evans-Pritchard and Gillies, 1976; Boyer and Nissenbaum, 1974), English popular cul-
ture (Thompson, 1992), and anti-semitism. Contemporary examples include riots and
pogroms against economically successful minorities (Horowitz, 2001; Brass, 2004; Tam-
biah, 1996; Chua, 2004). In many cases, the victim’s supposed misbehavior provides a
pretext for “punishment” that is really driven by self-interest. In the US, lynchings of
blacks may have been driven by inter-racial labour market competition (Beck and Tolnay,
1990; Raper, 1933). In Tanzania, elderly women are killed as witches when drought makes
them a burden to their relatives (Miguel, 2005).
The possibility of expropriation depends on the characteristics of the assets to be
appropriated and of the expropriation technology. Some forms of wealth are easier to
expropriate than others. Productive assets such as land and buildings can be seized.
Movable assets like currency are easier to preserve, and (barring slavery) human capital is
inexpropriable. When technology favors the defensive, it takes a large group to expropriate
someone. When it favors the o ensive, a small group can do the job. In hunter-gatherer
bands, the typical sanction is to ostracize o enders (Boehm, 2001); this must be done
by the whole band. Among pastoralists, only a few individuals are required to seize
someone’s cattle.
Easier expropriation may lead to more expropriation. More subtly, ease of expro-
priation may a ect whether expropriation is targeted on free-riders. Small groups can
easily coordinate to disseize specific individuals, while large groups may need a public
signal to coordinate. One possible signal is free-riding by the potential target. Pastoral-
ist societies are often “segmented”, with shifting allegiances, coalitions and feuds, and
widespread cattle-raiding, suggesting a high level of arbitrary disseizure (Lewis, 1999;
Evans-Pritchard, 1940). Mayshar et al. (2015) argue that cereal crops, which were easy
to take, were linked to the emergence of a hierarchy in which a minority of individu-
als expropriated others (but also provided protection against bandits). The import of
firearms and iron into the stateless societies of Guinea-Bissau caused a shift in expropri-
ation technology, since iron was used for weapons. These societies began to participate
in the slave trade. Judicial institutions were refashioned in order to meet demand: slaves
were accused of crimes and found guilty by ordeal (Hawthorne, 1999).
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The problems of collective expropriation may be particularly severe in ethnically di-
verse communities. Ethnic markers provide a natural coordination device for picking a
target. Also, expropriators may be more willing to target members of an outgroup, since
a rule of doing this protects them from being targeted themselves in future. These factors
can encourage ine cient confiscation. Also, even if minorities are not in fact more likely
to be targeted, they may perceive that they are, and therefore see less incentive not to
free-ride. Minority targets of sanctions face a di cult problem of causal identification:
are they targeted for breaking the rules, or because of who they are? Not surprisingly, dif-
ferent groups often disagree radically about the interpretation of particular events. These
factors can explain why diverse communities are often less successful at providing public
goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Easterly, 2001b)).
Some parts of our argument relate to existing work. The successful “common pool
resource” systems analyzed in Ostrom (1990) often used fines as sanctions. Other authors
have examined group coordination as a means of punishing free-riders. Weingast (1997)
models how citizens can coordinate to preserve the rule of law against infringements by
rulers. Experiments on coordinated punishment in public goods games include Casari and
Luini (2009). Abbink and Do an (2016) show that groups may coordinate to expropriate
vulnerable individuals. The theoretical literature on anarchy analyses individuals’ choice
to invest in production or in coercion (Skaperdas, 1992). Friedman (1999) argues that
modern societies use ine cient punishments such as imprisonment, rather than e cient
punishment such as fines, because e cient punishments may induce rent-seeking.
Classical theorists were aware of group expropriation. Hobbes’ analysis of anarchy in
the State of Nature starts from expropriation by groups:
...the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with
himselfe... if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may
probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and
deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty.
[our italics]
A more optimistic view, held before and after Hobbes, was that Natural Law might
govern behavior in the State of Nature. The right to punish breaches of Natural Law was
common to all humans; the problems of the State of Nature arose when humans failed to
apply this right impartially.3 We see our contribution as returning to this classical idea,
analyzing how humans may both use expropriation to punish free-riding, and abuse it out
of self-interest.
3See Locke Second Treatise sec. 13; Hooker Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity Book I X.4.
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3 A formal model
N actors are each endowed with e units of wealth, and interact in two stages: a voluntary
contribution stage, followed by a “expropriation” stage.
In the voluntary contribution stage, each actor i chooses to contribute pi œ [0, p¯] to a
common fund, with p¯Æ e. The value of the fund is then multiplied by ﬁ, with 1< ﬁ <N ,
and divided equally among the group. Player i now has interim wealth of wGi (p) =
e≠pi+(ﬁ/N)qpj . Contribution decisions are public.
In the subsequent expropriation stage, each actor i chooses a target xi œ {0,1, ..., i≠
1, i+ 1, ...,N}, where xi = 0 means that i chose not to target anyone, and xi > 0 means
that i chose to target actor xi. Everyone observes all targeting choices. The private cost
each actor incurs for targeting an individual, irrespectively of whether or not expropriation
is successful, is k Ø 0; this may be a material cost or, equivalently, an unobservable
“psychic” or “moral” cost.
Unless a player is targeted by at leastM Ø 1 other actors, targeting fails. If one actor,
j, is targeted by T ØM individuals, then j is successfully expropriated. An amount f
is confiscated from his interim wealth, and the targeters each receive (f ≠ l)/T , l < f ,
where l reflects an e ciency loss from expropriation (e.g. from costly conflict). The loss
f reflects how much of each individual’s wealth is expropriable; we assume that f < e≠ p¯,
so that at least f is always available from a player’s interim wealth. The threshold M is
a key parameter. It reflects the degree of coordination required to expropriate someone,
due to the underlying “expropriation technology” discussed above. If M >N/2, then at
most a single target can be expropriated. If M = 1, any individual can expropriate any
other.
The contribution that i’s targeting choice makes to i’s payo , as a function of the
targeting choices of other individuals, is therefore
ai =
Y___]___[
(f ≠ l)/T j≠k if xi = j ”= 0 and T j ØM ,
≠k if xi = j ”= 0 and T j <M ,
0 if xi = 0;
(1)
where T j ©qi [xi=j] is the number of players who targeted j. The contribution to i’s
payo  from other individuals targeting i is
vi =
Y][ ≠f if T i ØM ,0 otherwise. (2)
The payo  accruing to i from a profile of targeting choices x= (x1, ...,xN ) is then
wEi (x) = ai+ vi. (3)
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The total payo  to i from both stages is wGi (p)+wEi (x).
3.1 Equilibrium
We restrict attention to sub-game perfect equilibria of the above game.
Proceeding by backward induction, we focus first on the last stage. Define
T¯ = max
Tœ{M ,...,N≠1}
T such that (f ≠ l)/T Ø k. (4)
ForM > 1, expropriation requires coordination, and so targeting is not a strictly dominant
strategy for any positive k, and equilibria without expropriation are always possible. Also,
if M is too large, expropriation cannot be gainful. Specifically:
1. if (f ≠ l)/M < k, expropriation does not pay, and so nobody targets anyone in
equilibrium;
2. if (f≠ l)/M Ø k andM = 1, then in all equilibria, every player is targeted by exactly
one other player (because the net gain from choosing a unique target exceeds that
from choosing the same target as others);
3. if (f ≠ l)/M Ø k and M > 1, then expropriation requires coordination. In this
case, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if and only if (a) nobody targets himself;
(b) all expropriating groups have between M and T¯ members inclusive; (c) no two
expropriating groups di er in size by more than 1; (d) if any player is not targeting
somebody, then all expropriating groups have exactly T¯ members.
(Proofs are in the appendix.)
For k = 0, the set of equilibria with M = 1 is unchanged. With M > 1, any strategy
profile is an equilibrium if and only if (a) all expropriating groups have eitherM≠2 or less
members, or between M and N ≠1 members; (b) no two successful expropriating groups
di er in size by more than 1; and (c) if any player is not in a successful expropriating group,
then there is either no successful expropriating group, or a single successful expropriating
group of N ≠1 members. (Proof in the appendix.)
We might reinterpret “individuals” in the model as referring to small groups that al-
ways succeed in coordinating on the best outcome for them. If so, thenM = 1 corresponds
to the case where any such group can dispossess any other. The result is a Hobbesian
anarchy where expropriation is universal.
If second-stage actions are not conditioned on first-stage actions, then the only equilib-
rium in the first stage has pi = 0, ’i. However, second-stage strategies can be conditioned
on first period strategies, and this may allow for equilibrium contributions of pi > 0. For
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a given profile of contribution choices p= (p1, ...,pN ), let x(p) = (x1, ...,xN ) be the corre-
sponding profile of targeting decisions, and let pú be the profile of contribution decisions
actually played in equilibrium. An equilibrium of the whole game is then a pair (pú,x(·))
satisfying two conditions:
1. For all p, x(p) is an equilibrium of the expropriation stage, as defined above.
2. Given x(·), no possible deviation pÕi is profitable for any player, i, i.e.
(1≠ﬁ/N)(pÕi≠púi ) Ø wEi (x(pÕi,pú≠i))≠wEi (x(pú)),
where wEi is the payo  from the expropriation stage, as defined in (3).
For example, suppose that second-period strategies are as follows: if any individual i is
a unique lowest contributor in the first stage (pi < pj for all j ”= i), then a group of T
individuals targets i in the second stage; otherwise no-one is targeted. Then, any first-
stage symmetric contribution profile, pi = pj Æ f/(1≠ﬁ/N) for all i, j, can be supported
in equilibrium. More generally, if M > 1 any contribution profile with
pi Æ f/(1≠ﬁ/N), for all i, (5)
(i.e. where contributions are less than the cost to the victim of conditional expropriation)
can be sustained by targeting deviators.4 Nevertheless, there remain continuation equi-
libria where no expropriation takes place in the second stage, or where confiscation is not
conditioned on contribution levels, or is conditioned in the “wrong” way (e.g., where a
group targets the highest contributor, rather than the lowest; or it targets an individual at
random, or on the basis of payo  irrelevant characteristics). For all of these continuation
equilibria, the only individually-rational level of contributions in the first stage is zero,
and so the only first-stage equilibrium strategies are pi = 0, ’i. Similarly, if M = 1, then
since every player is always expropriated in all subgames, contributions must be zero.
Equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked. However, confiscation is “socially ine cient” in
that it entails a deadweight loss l. More precisely, maximizing the ex ante expected payo 
of a representative individual requires averting expropriation (i.e., if side payments were
allowed, then Pareto optimality would exclude expropriation). In order to to be socially
e cient in this sense, equilibria must feature expropriation only o  the equilibrium path.
Thus, an e cient equilibrium consists of every player contributing p¯ in the first stage and
no expropriation occurring in the second stage – supported by out-of-equilibrium strategies
4An equilibrium where targeting choices are conditioned on observed defections could also be thought
of as incorporating a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) in the second stage, with visible defection
acting as a signal that players use to make their strategies correlated.
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whereby an individual that deviates from p¯ in the first stage would be expropriated. From
the equilibrium conditions and (5), the conditions required for an e cient equilibrium to
be possible, for M > 1, are
(f ≠ l)/M Ø k, (6)
i.e. the minimum group size for expropriators, M , the cost of targeting k, and the size of
expropriable assets make expropriation profitable; and
f Ø (1≠ﬁ/N) p¯, (7)
i.e. expropriable assets are su ciently large relative to the public good level, p¯.
So, under suitable conditions, e cient outcomes can be sustained. However, there are
also many ine cient equilibria, with low contributions and/or confiscation occurring on
the equilibrium path. As detailed in Appendix 1, this indeterminacy may be resolved if
players’ choices are boundedly rational: if players can make “mistakes” in their choice
of target, being the lowest contributor can act as an observable marker that makes an
individual salient as a potential target and reduces targeting mistakes. Then defectors
may become a comparatively “safer bet” for targeting, and the only continuation equilibria
where expropriation is sustainable may be those where defectors are targeted, making it
possible to rule out socially ine cient equilibria.
3.2 Discussion
Punishment that is gainful for the punishers eliminates the second-order free-rider problem
but introduces a new one: opportunities to confiscate resources from non-defectors. Under
fully rational play, nothing makes defectors more “likely” targets for expropriation. But
boundedly rational players may use defection as a marker for targeting. If so, and if
coordination is easy but not too easy, then only defectors can be expropriated in any
equilibrium.
This model abstracts from some features of the real world. First, it may be costly
to detect free riding, and expropriation may require upfront costs, such as investment in
coercive power. However, the presence of such costs does not change our conclusion that
public goods provision can be supported by expropriation. To see this, alter the game
above, so that nobody can be expropriated unless total contributions of at least q > 0 are
provided in the public goods game. Now, suppose that, in the original game, there was
an equilibrium with contributions p= (p1, ...,pN ), such that for any player i,
q
j ”=i pj Ø q.
Then contributions p can be supported in the new game, using exactly the same strategies.
For, a player who deviates to contributing zero cannot reduce total contributions below
q, and therefore still faces expropriation.
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Second, free-riders may o er side payments to ward o  expropriation. For example, the
successful common pool resource management systems analyzed in Ostrom (1990) often
used fines as punishments. Suppose that an individual who faces being expropriated can
bargain with the group targeting him. They will agree some transfer between f ≠ l and
f , which will benefit both sides since no resources are destroyed. Expropriators will get
more while the target pays less. This may increase the maximum group size in (4), loosen
the constraint on expropriation (f ≠ l)/M Ø k, and decrease the maximum contribution
levels in (5). However, the basic insights of the model are unchanged. Similarly, if the cost
of targeting k depends on the size of the targeting group, the constraint on expropriation
will become more complex without changing the model much.
Finally, individuals can be heterogenous along a number of dimensions. We discuss
the implications of this next.
4 Group heterogeneity
Asymmetries across individuals with respect to payo -relevant parameters can give rise
to asymmetries in targeting choices. If f , l or k are di erent for di erent expropriation
targets, then condition (6) may only hold for some individuals, and so only those indi-
viduals can face punishment. For example, if only some individuals have expropriable
amounts fi satisfying (6), then in the most e cient equilibrium, they will each contribute
pi = fi/(1≠ ﬁ/N) under threat of expropriation if they do not, while others will not
contribute.
If there are asymmetries but (6) is still satisfied for all individuals, then, under fully
rational play, those asymmetries do not change the set of equilibria. Under boundedly
rational play, however, any visible marker that identifies some individuals, may make
them salient targets for expropriation, irrespective of their behavior. For example, ethnic
riots may target minority businesses for looting.
If visible di erences are salient, individuals may use them, rather than free-riding, to
coordinate on targets.This applies whether the visible marker is payo -relevant (e.g. a
higher fi) or not (e.g. ethnicity).5 This will make equilibria with ine cient expropriation
more likely and e cient equilibria less likely. If so, then less homogenous societies will
find it harder to prevent free-riding. Indeed, ethnically diverse communities appear to be
less successful at providing public goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2000; Easterly 2001b; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Habyarimana, Humphreys
and Posner, 2009).
5It is also not incompatible with majorities blaming their actions on minorities’ bad behaviour: in
fact, that is typical of intergroup violence (Horowitz, 2001).
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The problems of ethnically divided societies are often thought to lie in deep cultural
di erences. However, even when there is a strong shared culture, or where di erent
cultural norms are mutually well-understood, the mere fact of visible di erence may be
enough to make one group a target. For example, in Bosnia, Muslims, Serbs and Croats
lived in mixed villages and, while maintaining cultural di erences, also shared identities as
villagers, and were knowledgeable about each others’ customs (Bringa, 1993); yet, during
the Yugoslav conflict, after politicians used the media to demonize outgroups, di erent
identities swiftly became a basis for conflict (Oberschall, 2000; Bozic-Roberson, 2004). In
the terminology of Habyarimana et al. (2007), our explanation for ethnic divisions relies
on “equilibrium selection” rather than on deep underlying preferences.
The California Gold Rush shows how group heterogeneity can interfere with informal
enforcement. The Gold Rush started in 1849 when gold was discovered in the territory,
shortly after California was ceded to the United States. The legal status of gold claims
remained unclear until 1866, and state authority was distant or absent in the California
territory: there was no police force, and in the first years even the identity of the legal
authorities was unclear. So, miners had to make and enforce their own rules. As early
histories of the Gold Rush emphasized, they did so successfully. Americans, with expe-
rience of democratic institutions such as the town meeting, set up “miners’ meetings”
to allocate property rights and make other rules. The camps were not a Hobbesian war
of all against all, but an ordered anarchy (Umbeck, 1977; Zerbe and Anderson, 2001).
Property rights – “claims” to a particular area – were enforced by the majority. A miner
who violated others’ claims could expect to have his own claim considered nonexclusive
and open to jumpers, in an example of punishment as expropriation. Other crimes were
also collectively punished by the population after short and informal trials (Howe, 1923).
Not all camps were equal, though. The Gold Rush drew in a wide array of nationali-
ties, from Europeans fleeing post-1848 persecutions to “Chileans” (i.e. Latin Americans)
and Chinese. Stewart (2009) gathers evidence on twenty-five early mining camps, and
shows that ethnically homogenous camps were more likely to succeed at enforcing prop-
erty rights. His explanation is that members of di erent ethnic groups were less willing
to cooperate, due to di erent norms and lower altruism towards outgroup members, or
less able to cooperate and coordinate, due to cultural and linguistic di erences. These are
the standard explanations described in the previous section. But newer historical work
suggests a further reason. There was a dark side to mining camp law. Since rule violators
could have their own claims expropriated, groups of miners faced a temptation to accuse
others of violations. Punishment of rule-breakers shaded into arbitrary expropriation.
Non-Anglo-Americans were particularly often targets: “[t]he French, the Spanish Amer-
icans, and the Chinese each tended to be separate elements in the population.... from
an early date the majority displayed toward these nationalities a persistent antagonism
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that was easily triggered into bullying, persecution and ostracism” (Paul, 1980). A classic
example is the “Chilean war” of 1849:
Anglos had begun mining some dry diggings that Chileans had worked
earlier, and when the latter returned for the winter the two groups soon were
at odds. In a called meeting the Anglos formed a mining district and drafted
regulations, beginning with “No foreigners shall be permitted to work at these
mines.”... (Paul 1980, p. 241).
Ramon Gil Navarro, an Argentinian miner, described the a air: “Twenty-two Americans
came over to the camp of the Chileans and had co ee with them.... While they were doing
this, they went about taking the weapons of the Chileans without their noticing.... They
were all taken to the house of the judge, who extorted 150 ounces of gold from them.”
Later there was a pitched battle between Chileans and Anglo-Americans; Chileans were
arrested and brought before a judge, three were hanged and others possibly had their ears
cut o . Each of these sides had their own “judge” to legitimize their actions (Navarro,
2000). The failure of ethnically diverse mining camps was not only due to individual free-
riding, but also to rampant expropriation of minority group members by the majority
group.
5 Experiment
Our model has multiple equilibria. To learn which are likely to be played, we study be-
havior in a laboratory experiment. The main treatment has a public goods stage followed
by a expropriation stage. We vary the minimum group size for successful expropriation.
We also vary the heterogeneity of groups, using a minimal marker of group identity –
randomly assigned, payo -irrelevant color labels.
Subjects were randomly allocated into groups of four. Each subject was given a color
label (purple or green), which stayed the same throughout the experiment and was visible
to other group members. They stayed in the same group throughout the experiment.
They played twenty rounds. In our baseline, treatment PX, each round took place as
follows.
First, the group of four played the public goods stage, which was a standard linear
public goods game. Each subject was endowed with 50 Experimental Currency Units
(ECU) and could contribute them to a common fund; total contributions were multiplied
by 1.4 before being divided equally among the group; feedback on individual contributions
was given.
Next, the group played the expropriation stage. Each subject was endowed with a
further 50 ECU. Each subject could target either a single other group member, or nobody;
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Treatment Description N groups
PX Baseline: Public goods stage followed by expropriation stage 16
P Public goods stage only 8
X Expropriation stage only 6
PX-M3 As PX 16
PX-M2 Expropriation successful if two or more subjects targeted
same person
15
PX-M1 Expropriation successful if one or more subjects targeted same
person
14
PX-Het As PX treatment, one minority subject per group 16
P-Het As P treatment, one minority subject per group 8
X-Het As X treatment, one minority subject per group 7
PX-Hist 10 rounds confiscation stage only, 10 rounds as PX 12
PX-Noise As PX, noise added to contribution reports 8
PX-Stranger As PX, groups rematched between rounds 9*
PX-Hist-Het As PX-Hist, one minority subject per group 11
PX-Noise-Het As PX-Noise, one minority subject per group 5
PX-Stranger-Het As PX-Stranger, one minority subject per group 9*
* 9 matching groups defined by session/treatment
Table 1: Treatments
targeting involved no monetary cost. If at least three subjects targeted the same subject,
the target was “expropriated”, losing 50 ECU, and the expropriators each gained 15 ECU.
Lastly, subjects learned how many people targeted each group member. This treatment
implements our theoretical model, with N = 4, M = 3, e= 100, p¯= 50, ﬁ = 1.4, f = 50,
l= 5 and k = 0.6 We introduce variants of this treatment below. Table 1 summarizes the
di erent treatments. Appendix 2 describes the order in which treatments were run.
After each experiment finished, subjects answered a short questionnaire and were paid
privately for one randomly chosen round, at a rate of 1 ECU = 10 UK pence, plus a
£2.50 show-up fee. Sessions were run at two UK universities from June 2013 to May
2016, using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were invited using the hroot subject pool
management software (Bock, Nicklisch and Baetge, 2012). In total 712 subjects took part
in 47 sessions. Sessions lasted about one hour. Average earnings were £13.33.
5.1 Free-riding and coordinated expropriation
We first focus on a central idea of this paper: the threat of expropriation can increase
public goods contributions, but the presence of a public goods problem can justify higher
6Costless targeting, k= 0, introduces some extra equilibria which we discuss in the appendix. However,
note that there may be a psychological cost of targeting an individual (e.g. shame).
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Figure 1: Mean contributions over time, treatments PX and P. Shaded areas are 95%
confidence intervals
levels of expropriation. In the experiment, the benefit of higher contributions outweighs
the deadweight cost of expropriation (just 5 ECU). However, we do not know the rela-
tive cost of expropriation in field settings, so it is important to analyze each dimension
separately. To do so, we compare our baseline treatment PX against two alternatives.
In treatment P, each of the 20 rounds consisted of the public goods stage on its own,
without a subsequent expropriation stage. In treatment X, each round consisted of the
expropriation stage on its own, without a preceding public goods stage.
Result 1. Contributions to the public good were significantly higher in the PX treatment
than in the P treatment.
Figure 1 shows mean public goods contributions over time in these treatments. Mean
contributions per group are significantly higher in PX than P (26.20 vs. 11.67, p < 0.05;
tests are Mann-Whitney tests at group level unless otherwise stated).
Result 2. There were significantly more expropriations in PX than in X treatments.
The mean number of expropriations in a group was 9.62 in PX vs. 2.67 in X (p <
0.01).
We next confirm that expropriation was indeed targeted on low contributors.
Result 3. In the PX treatment, at individual level, lowest contributors were more likely
to be targeted.
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The second column of Figure 3 shows that a group’s unique lowest contributor in a
round was more likely to be expropriated than not; a non-unique lowest contributor faced
a small risk of expropriation; and other people were almost never expropriated.7
Result 4. In the PX treatment, at group level, mean contributions were positively corre-
lated with expropriations.
If some groups successfully use expropriation to threaten low contributors, then at
group level, more expropriation should be associated with higher contributions, as in
public goods games with costly punishment (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). Indeed, across PX
groups, the correlation between number of successful expropriations and average contri-
butions was 0.608 (p < 0.05).8
5.2 Varying minimum group size for expropriation
With a minimum size of M = 3, expropriation appeared beneficial on balance. We now
examine how changes in M a ect contributions and expropriation levels. Our argument
and model suggested that larger groups might be more likely to coordinate on free-riders
rather than picking victims arbitrarily. Treatments PX-M1, PX-M2 and PX-M3 set M
to 1, 2 and 3 respectively. In each case, if M or more subjects picked a single victim, that
person lost her endowment of 50 ECU, and 45 ECU was shared among the expropriating
group (so each expropriator got 45 ECU, 22.5 ECU or 15 ECU depending on the group
size). PX-M3 is the same as the baseline PX. Treatments were balanced across groups
within sessions.
Predictions from the model are as follows: under rational play, whenM = 1, each indi-
vidual is expropriated by one other individual irrespective of contributions, which are then
zero. When M = 2 or M = 3, there are multiple equilibria including e cient equilibria
with full contributions and no expropriation observed, as well as ine cient equilibria with
or without expropriation. If players make mistakes with positive probability, as in our
model of bounded rationality, then failure to coordinate will be more likely when M = 3.
If this probability is lower when the target is a lowest contributor, then expropriation may
be more targeted on low contributors for higher values of M .
Result 5. Moving from PX-M3 to PX-M2 to PX-M1, contribution levels remained the
same or decreased, while levels of expropriation increased.
7About 32% of subjects were lowest contributors in a given round (16% unique lowest, 16% non-
unique lowest). If all four group members contributed the same amount, we do not classify them as
“lowest contributors”.
8The correlation remains large and significant if we correlate expropriations in periods 1-10 with
contributions in periods 11-20.
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PX-M1 PX-M2 PX-M3 p, PX-M1 vs -M2 p, PX-M1 vs -M3 p, PX-M2 vs -M3
Contributions 13.66 28.35 27.89 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.98
Expropriations 54.94 15.73 8.43 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.01
Attempts 75.44 59.00 61.29 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.97
Prop. exprop.: unique lowest 0.81 0.84 0.7 0.49 0.26 0.12
... non-unique lowest 0.68 0.19 0.06 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.01
... other 0.65 0.12 0.01 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.01
Table 2: E ects of varying minimum group size for expropriation
The first three rows of Table 2 show mean contribution levels, mean numbers of ex-
propriations and numbers of expropriation attempts for the three treatments. Figure 2
plots contributions and expropriations. There were significantly lower contributions, more
expropriations and more expropriations attempts in PX-M1 than the other treatments;
and more expropriations in PX-M2 than PX-M3. Thus, a lower M was unambiguously
worse: it led to weakly lower contributions, with strictly higher expropriation levels. The
next two results tell why this was so.
Result 6. When the minimum group size for expropriation was smaller, expropriation
was less targeted on low contributors.
Rows 4-6 of Table 2 shows the probability of being expropriated for unique lowest
contributors, non-unique lowest contributors and others, along with significance tests.
Unique lowest contributors were equally likely to be targeted in all treatments, but non-
unique lowest contributors and others faced much more expropriation for smaller values
of M .
Result 7. Individuals reacted to expropriation by increasing their contributions only in
PX-M2 and PX-M3 treatments.
Table 3 regresses contributions on lagged contributions and on the number of group
members who targeted the subject in the previous round. In treatment PX-M1, being
expropriated by one or more group members had no e ect. In treatments PX-M2 and PX-
M3, those who were successfully expropriated increased their contributions. The largest
e ect is for expropriation by 3 group members in the PX-M3 treatment.9
In public goods experiments, making punishment easier typically leads to higher con-
tributions (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Chaudhuri 2011). These results show a di erent
pattern. Expropriation levels consistently rise as expropriation gets easier. By contrast,
contributions are low when expropriation is impossible, as in treatment P, rise when it
is possible (treatments PX and PX-M3), but then fall again if it is too easy (treatment
PX-M1). The likely reason is that as expropriation gets easier, it gets less targeted on low
9Expropriation decisions may not be exogenous, even controlling for lagged contributions. As an
alternative specification, we included Period and a dummy variable for being the unique lowest contributor
in the previous round. Results were robust.
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PX-M1 PX-M2 PX-M3
Intercept 4.02úúú 2.93úú 6.20úúú
(0.85) (1.08) (1.64)
Lag contrib. 0.64úúú 0.89úúú 0.78úúú
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Targeters=1 0.24 ≠0.17 ≠0.84
(0.48) (0.53) (0.79)
Targeters=2 0.70 1.59ú ≠1.05
(0.71) (0.79) (1.12)
Targeters=3 ≠0.04 3.75úúú 7.85úú
(1.51) (1.04) (2.56)
Num. obs. 1280 1200 1120
R2 0.46 0.77 0.60
Adj. R2 0.46 0.77 0.60
L.R. 784.17 1768.99 1037.83
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05. Robust s.e.s clustered by group.
Table 3: OLS regressions: individual contributions, treatments PX-M1/2/3
contributors. This fits the prediction of our model of bounded rationality and salience. It
also appears that in PX-M1, individuals did not assume that being targeted was a result
of low contributions, and hence did not raise their contributions.
5.3 Heterogenous groups
We argue that confiscatory punishment is particularly problematic in heterogenous soci-
eties, since minorities, rather than free-riders, might be targeted for expropriation. We
tested this by introducing a minimal form of heterogeneity: a public, randomly assigned
label with no payo  consequences or group manipulation.10 Recall that in our experiment
every subject was given a color label (purple or green), which stayed the same throughout
the experiment and was visible to other group members. Instructions made clear that the
label assignment was random. In treatment PX-Het, one subject within each group had
a di erent color from the other three subjects. We call such subjects minorities and the
other subjects the majority. In all other respects, PX-Het was the same as PX. Similarly,
treatments P-Het and X-Het varied from treatments P and PX only by introducing a
single minority subject.11 This is a hard test for our theory: if even this weak form of
heterogeneity a ects behavior, then the same mechanism should work more strongly with
highly salient real-world identities.
10Other experiments using this approach include Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2002), E erson,
Lalive and Fehr (2008) and Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009).
11In all non “-Het” treatments, all subjects within a group had the same colour label.
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As in the homogenous treatment variants, mean contributions per group are signif-
icantly higher in PX-Het than P-Het treatments (PX-Het 21.74 vs. P-Het 8.94). The
group-level correlation between number of expropriations and average contributions in
PX-Het was 0.685 (p < 0.01).
Result 8. Contributions were not significantly di erent between PX and PX-Het treat-
ments, nor between P and P-Het treatments.
Although mean contributions are higher in homogenous than heterogenous groups,
these di erences are not significant (PX 26.20 vs. PX-Het 21.74, p = 0.27; P 11.67 vs.
P-Het 8.94, p = 1.00). Thus, our mechanism alone was not enough to make heterogenous
groups less e cient at public goods provision.
The next result shows that minorities were more likely to be targeted, as our theory
suggests, but only in specific circumstances.
Result 9. In treatment PX-Het, minorities were more likely to be expropriated than
majorities only when they were non-unique lowest contributors.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of subjects expropriated per round, grouped by both
contribution and minority status. Expropriation was overwhelmingly targeted on lowest
contributors in all treatments. A unique lowest contributor was especially likely to be
expropriated.
Overall, there is no di erence in the number of expropriations su ered by minority
and majority individuals within PX-Het (minorities: 1.69, majorities: 1.62, p = 0.34).
Minorities who were a lowest contributor, but not the unique lowest contributor, within
a group were expropriated significantly more often (but note that contribution levels are
not exogenous).12 Thus, heterogenous groups appear to have only targeted minorities so
as to coordinate on one of several equal lowest contributors. This supports our theory of
minority salience, but only in a limited sense.
Result 10. In treatment PX-Het, minorities and majorities increased their contributions
equally after being expropriated.
Next, we examine how individual contribution decisions responded to being expropri-
ated. The first column of Table 4 regresses contribution decisions in PX-Het on lagged
contribution decisions, and on the number of other group members targeting the sub-
ject (Targeters) in the previous round, interacted with minority status. Subjects may
contribute more after being targeted by 1 or 2 others if they perceive a greater threat of
future expropriation. Subjects react to being expropriated, or to being targeted by 2 other
12See the logit regression in the appendix.
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Figure 3: Proportion expropriated by minority status and contribution, PX and PX-Het
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PX-Het PX-Hist-Het PX-Noise-Het PX-Stranger-Het
Intercept 3.66úúú 2.40ú 3.45úú 4.07úúú
(0.85) (1.16) (1.34) (0.85)
Lag contrib. 0.78úúú 0.74úúú 0.75úúú 0.71úúú
(0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.04)
Targeters=1 0.04 ≠0.93 0.40 ≠0.09
(0.95) (1.07) (0.81) (0.52)
Targeters=2 3.50úú 3.88ú 1.55 1.22
(1.32) (1.59) (1.04) (1.03)
Targeters=3 8.70úúú 12.26úúú 9.59ú 4.71úú
(1.34) (3.03) (3.75) (1.74)
Minority 0.18 0.87 0.25 0.35
(1.12) (0.96) (1.23) (0.94)
Minority x Targeters=1 1.16 ≠0.01 0.25 ≠1.70
(1.50) (1.87) (1.69) (1.17)
Minority x Targeters=2 ≠3.41 ≠5.61úú 1.10 ≠2.34
(2.44) (1.88) (2.93) (1.56)
Minority x Targeters=3 ≠1.89 ≠10.54ú ≠7.07ú ≠2.51
(2.34) (5.08) (3.52) (1.37)
Num. obs. 1277 396 400 1440
R2 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.47
Adj. R2 0.59 0.56 0.55 0.47
L.R. 1151.37 331.62 328.47 925.43
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05. Robust s.e.s clustered by group/matching group.
Table 4: OLS regressions of individual contributions
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group members, by increasing their contributions. There is no evidence that minorities
react di erently from majorities: all interaction terms are insignificant.13
The above results support only parts of our story about heterogeneity. Participants
did coordinate on minority group members, but only when they were one of two or more
equal lowest contributors. Minority participants did not react di erently to punishment
than majorities. We ran further treatments to test the robustness of these results and to
see under what conditions intergroup di erences might emerge. These involved variations
of the PX and PX-Het treatments.
PX-Hist and PX-Hist-Het sessions consisted of ten rounds of the expropriation game
only (as in treatment X), followed by ten rounds of the public goods game plus expropri-
ation game (as in treatment PX). Majorities might coordinate on targeting minorities in
early rounds, and this might a ect expectations in later rounds.
In PX-Noise and PX-Noise-Het treatments, we added an independent shock to each
player’s report of other players’ contributions, so that di erent players would see di erent
contribution levels. This mimicked a situation where levels of free-riding, and hence the
reasons for expropriation, were uncertain and might be interpreted di erently by di erent
groups.
In PX-Stranger and PX-Stranger-Het treatments, subjects were rematched in new
groups of 4 between rounds (staying within the same heterogenous/homogenous treatment
and majority/minority status). This is like having a larger community, where individuals
may be less sure how to interpret each other’s behaviour.
In the -Het variant of all these treatments, groups had a single participant with a
minority colour label, just as in PX-Het.
Result 11. In PX-Hist-Het and PX-Stranger-Het treatments, minorities were signifi-
cantly more likely to be targeted than majorities.
PX-Hist-Het PX-Noise-Het PX-Stranger-Het
Majority 0.02 0.05 0.07
Minority 0.22 0.07 0.20
p < 0.05 0.86 < 0.001
Table 5: Expropriation rates in 3 heterogenous treatments. PX-Hist-Het treatment,
rounds 11-20 only.
Table 5 shows expropriation rates of minority and majority individuals in the PX-Hist-
Het, PX-Noise-Het and PX-Stranger-Het treatments, with p values for di erences between
them (from paired Wilcoxon tests at group level, or session/treatment level for Stranger
treatments). In PX-Hist treatments we only use rounds 11-20. If we break expropriation
13See Footnote 9.
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down by contribution levels, then as in treatment PX, only lowest contributors were
targeted. However, unlike in treatment PX, in PX-Hist and PX-Stranger treatments
minorities were more likely to be targeted than majorities even among unique lowest
contributors.14
Result 12. In PX-Hist-Het and PX-Noise-Het treatments, minorities increased their con-
tributions less than majorities after being expropriated.
Columns 2-4 of Table 4 report regressions of contributions for PX-Hist-Het, PX-Noise-
Het and PX-Stranger-Het treatments. As in treatment PX-Het, majority subjects in-
creased their contribution after being targeted by two group members or expropriated by
three group members. However, minority subjects increased their contributions less, or
not at all: the interaction of Targeters with minority status is generally negative, and
significant in PX-Hist-Het and PX-Noise-Het treatments.15
These treatments show that under “di cult” circumstances (a history of di erential
treatment, or imperfectly visible contributions to a public good), minorities were targeted
more than majorities, and reacted di erently, increasing their contributions to the public
good less after being targeted or expropriated. This could be because they expected to
be expropriated irrespective of their contribution level, or because they resented being
targeted unfairly. These mechanisms did not lead to significant unconditional di erences
in contributions between homogenous and heterogenous treatments, so it could be argued
that they are not having a strong impact.16 However, the high variance in contributions
within treatments lowers our power to detect di erences here. Also, our group manipula-
tion was very minimal: nothing more than randomly assigned color labels.
6 Conclusion
Punishing free-riders need not always be costly. It can be profitable – even too profitable.
Existing theory conceptualizes social order as preventing individual free-riding, and down-
plays the simultaneous problem of controlling expropriation by groups. The two issues
are related in complex ways, and social order involves a delicate balance between them.
As our experiment shows, if technology or social institutions make expropriation easy,
this can harm rather than help public good provision, and can lead to deadweight costs
of its own.
Rethinking the theory of public good provision suggests a new explanation for the
problems of heterogenous communities. The history of the California Gold Rush shows
14See Appendix 3.
15See footnote 9.
16Details are reported in the appendix.
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that “punishment of free-riders” (or “expropriation of minorities”) can spark conflict.
Our experiments imposed a minimal form of heterogeneity: di erent, randomly assigned,
public color labels. Nevertheless, majority groups used this as a coordination device for
expropriation. In some treatments, minorities reacted to expropriation di erently from
majority group members, refusing to increase their contributions.
Our argument’s policy implications with regard to heterogeneity are, in one sense,
pessimistic. “Nation-building” is often proposed as a solution to ethnic tensions (Miguel,
2004). However, if even minimal di erences between groups can cause problems, nation-
building must wholly erase these di erences to succeed, which is di cult. The same is
true of integration policies for ethnic minorities in developed societies. An alternative
approach is to create institutions that reduce ambiguity and legitimize the punishment of
free-riders. In our experiments, minorities only reacted di erently to punishment when a
history of previous expropriation, or an ambiguous situation, made it hard to know the
reason for being punished. When contributions were common knowledge, they contributed
more after being expropriated, just as majority group members did. In the real world,
liberal institutions such as trials with due process may reassure all groups that they are
being treated fairly, while intergroup communication can defuse conflict by squashing
rumors and misperceptions (Easterly, 2001a; Varshney, 2003).
A large literature, including important work on costly punishment and on cooperation
in repeated games, has grown from the assumption that sanctioning is an under-supplied
public good. We have argued that this assumption needs rethinking. We hope that doing
so will lead to new lines of research. Important topics include: how state institutions can
emerge from decentralized expropriation; the link between expropriation and intergroup
conflict; and how expropriative punishment is perceived by di erent groups in heteroge-
nous societies.
Appendix 1: Proofs
Equilibria in the expropriation subgame when k > 0: rational play
If k > (f ≠ l)/M > 0, then targeting always costs more than it can earn.
If M = 1, then, unless everybody is being targeted by exactly one player, some player
j is not being targeted, and another player who is in a expropriating group of two or
more, or who is not in any expropriating group, could profitably deviate to targeting j.
If M > 1, three conditions define an equilibrium: players targeting no-one (xi = 0)
must weakly prefer not to target anyone; players targeting someone (xi > 0) must weakly
prefer not to play xi = 0; and they must also weakly prefer not to change targets. The
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first condition implies that if any player is not targeting somebody, then either nobody is
successfully expropriated, or anyone who is targeted is targeted by T =N ≠1 players, so
that, by (4), joining and increasing the size of the expropriating group would cost more
than it gained. The second condition implies that if any player is targeting somebody,
they are in an expropriating group of at least sizeM , so that expropriation succeeds. The
third condition implies that all successful expropriating groups di er by at most one in
size, otherwise a player in the larger expropriating group could increase their payo  by
switching to the smaller one.
Thus, there are two kinds of equilibria: those where some players do not target anyone
and all successful expropriating groups are of size T ; and those where everybody targets
someone successfully, and all expropriating groups are of the same size plus or minus one.
The second kind requires at least two targets, since nobody prefers to target themselves,
and this requires M ÆN/2.
Equilibria when k = 0
The proof follows the same lines as for the case k > 0. The maximum profitable expro-
priating group size is T¯ = N ≠ 1. If anyone is in an expropriating group of size M ≠ 1
then another player would be able to join and achieve the highest possible payo . (Note
that M≠1ÆN≠2 so there is always a player outside the expropriating group who is not
being targeted by it.)
Boundedly rational play in the expropriation subgame
Suppose that individuals make mistakes in their targeting: if individual i targets individ-
ual j, with some probability, “ œ (0, 1/2), the targeting will fail and be directed instead
towards a randomly chosen individual, with an equal probability “/(N≠1) for each. This
could happen because of semantic ambiguity in the identity of the targets (as in Crawford
and Haller, 1990): if there are multiple symmetric targets and there is no clear label that
identifies them, coordination requires a “common language” that makes it possible for
players to uniquely identify each other’s strategies.17
Then if an individual i conjectures that another T j ≠ 1 individuals are targeting the
same individual j,the expected payo  to an individual from targeting the same individual,
17Such “equilibria with trembles” can be rationalized by reference to a game of incomplete information,
where players can be one of two types, either rational players that best respond to other players, or
automatons that simply randomize across targets. Then, given a known fraction of automatons in the
population, the conditions EU(xi = j |M ,T ,“) Ø 0 correspond to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
incomplete information game.
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j, is
Nÿ
T=M
Pr(T j≠1= T ≠1 | “) f ≠ l
T
≠k © EU(xi = j |M ,T j ,“), (8)
where Pr(T j≠ 1 = T ≠ 1 | “) is the probability that j will be actually targeted by T ≠ 1
individuals other than i.
As M increases, it should be harder to target anybody in equilibrium: a group with
more members is more likely to su er coordination failures, and this lowers the expected
payo  in (8). Below we prove this for the case where N is large, as well as for the case
N = 4 (as in our experiment). Thus, when minimum group size is larger, sustaining
coordination requires a lower individual probability of mistakes.
When the second-stage is combined with a first-stage contribution game, actions in
the first stage can guide coordination choices in the second stage. In the experimental
literature on coordination games (e.g. Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich, 2008), in-
determinacy in coordination games can be resolved by payo -irrelevant aspects that are
salient to subjects (such as departures from symmetry). Here, contributions to the public
good can play this role; i.e. being the lowest contributor can act as an observable marker
that makes an individual salient and reduces semantic ambiguity, lowering “ from “0 to
“D < “0 when targeting that individual. Then for some parameter values, expropriation
will be viable only when the target is a unique lowest contributor. There will be equilibria
where defectors are expropriated o  the equilibrium path of play, but no equilibria where
non-defectors are expropriated. In particular, ifM is low so that “0< “¯, then all equilibria
will survive; if M is such that “D < “¯ < “0, then only defectors can be expropriated in
equilibrium; ifM is so high that “¯ < “D, then expropriation is never possible. Thus, there
is a “sweet spot” where coordination is easy enough to expropriate defectors, but not so
easy that non-defectors can be expropriated.
To illustrate, suppose N = 4 and (f ≠ l)/k = 4. For M = 3, in the expropriation
subgame, there is no equilibrium with expropriation when “ = “0 = 1/5, but there is
an equilibrium with expropriation for for “ = “D = 1/10. Thus, in the whole game,
there are equilibria where positive contributions are supported by o -the-equilibrium-
path threats, but there are no equilibria featuring ine cient expropriation. (There are still
“coordination failure” equilibria where contributions are zero and nobody is expropriated.)
If M = 1 then the only equilibrium involves expropriation of all players, for both values
of “, and therefore in the whole game contributions are zero and the outcome is the most
ine cient one.
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Equilibria in the expropriation subgame: boundedly rational play with N large
Consider a candidate equilibrium where an individual j is targeted by a group of size
R ØM , and that there are Q other individuals who are targeting individuals other than
j; N ≠R≠Q individuals are targeting nobody. For somebody in the targeting group (R)
considering the choice of target, the probability that exactly X individuals actually target
j is then
Xÿ
z=0
A
R
z
B
(1≠“)z“R≠z
A
Q
X≠ z
B3
“
N
4X≠z 3
1≠ “
N
4Q≠(X≠z)
.
If N is large, the terms of this sum approach zero for all z except for z =X, and the
expression approachesA
R
X
B
(1≠“)X“R≠X . (9)
Then, the expected utility of a player targeting j approaches the sum of (9), over all
values of X between M and R:
EU(R) ©≠k+
Rÿ
X=M
A
R
X
B
(1≠“)X“R≠X f ≠ l
X
. (10)
For an equilibrium in which somebody is targeted, it is necessary and su cient that
this expected utility is positive for all R. Note that the above approximation does not
depend on Q. Thus, if the above is positive (negative) for some R, then for all su ciently
large N there will (will not) be an equilibrium in which a single group of size R targets a
player.
The condition for the existence of any equilibrium in which someone is targeted is
therefore that (10) is positive for some R:
EU © max
Rœ{M ,...,N≠1}
EU(R)
= max
Rœ{M ,...,N≠1}
≠k+
Rÿ
X=M
A
R
X
B
(1≠“)X“R≠X f ≠ l
X
Ø 0. (11)
We now show that EU is decreasing in “. Thus, EU will be non-negative for “ Æ “¯,
where “¯ solves (11) with equality. Because EU is also strictly decreasing in M (since this
shrinks the set of possible expropriating group sizes R and of “achieved” group sizes X),
when M increases “¯ will be lower.
The proof has two parts:
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1. EU(M) is strictly decreasing in “. This can be seen by setting R =M in (10).
2. For any value of R and “, if EU(R) is weakly (strictly) increasing in “, then EU(R≠
1) is weakly (strictly) greater than EU(R).
Putting these two together, if RÕ is such that EU(RÕ) = maxRœ{M ,...,N≠1}EU(R), then
EU(RÕ) =EU must be constant or decreasing in “. Therefore, EU itself is decreasing in
“ everywhere.
To prove point 2, first compute DEU(R) © EU(R≠1)≠EU(R):
DEU(R) =
R≠1ÿ
X=M
(1≠“)X“R≠1≠X f ≠ l
X
AA
R≠1
X
B
≠“
A
R
X
BB
≠ (1≠“)R f ≠ l
R
=
R≠1ÿ
X=M
A
R
X
B
f ≠ l
X
(1≠“)X“R≠X≠1
3
R≠X
R
≠“
4
≠ (1≠“)R f ≠ l
R
,
where the second line uses that
A
R≠1
X
B
= (1≠X/R)
A
R
X
B
. This is positive if and only
if
R≠1ÿ
X=M
A
R
X
B
f ≠ l
X
(1≠“)X“R≠X≠1
3
1≠X
R
≠“
4
> (1≠“)R f ≠ l
R
. (12)
Next, di erentiate EU(R) by “ to give:
Rÿ
X=M
A
R
X
B
f ≠ l
X
1
(1≠“)X(R≠X)“R≠X≠1≠X(1≠“)X≠1“R≠X
2
=
R≠1ÿ
X=M
A
R
X
B
f ≠ l
X
(1≠“)X≠1“R≠X≠1 ((1≠“)R≠X)≠ f ≠ l
R
(1≠“)R≠1R.
This is positive if and only if
R≠1ÿ
X=M
A
R
X
B
f ≠ l
X
(1≠“)X≠1“R≠X≠1 ((1≠“)R≠X) >f ≠ l
R
(1≠“)R≠1R.
Multiplying both sides by (1≠“)/R gives the same inequality as (12).
Equilibria in the expropriation subgame: boundedly rational play with N = 4
We compare the cases M = 1 and M = 3. Define ﬂ = (f ≠ l)/k. When M = 1, the
expected payo  for a player from targeting another individual, assuming that all other
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individuals choose a di erent target, is18
EU
1
xi = j |M = 1,T j = 1,“
2
= (f≠ l)
3
(1≠“)2+2 (“/2)(1≠“)2 +
(“/2)2
3
4
≠k. (13)
This is less than unity and is decreasing in “. For ﬂ< 1, (13) is always negative, and for
ﬂ > 1 it is non-negative if “ < 9/7≠
1
(84≠ 3ﬂ)/ﬂ
21/2
/7 © “Õ. For M = 3, the expected
payo  for a player from targeting another individual, assuming that two other individuals
also choose the same target, is
EU(xi = j |M = 3,T j = 3,“) = (f ≠ l) (1≠“)
2
3 ≠k, (14)
which is decreasing in “. For ﬂ < 3, (14) is always negative, and for ﬂ > 3 it is non-
negative if “ < 1≠ (3/ﬂ)1/2 © “ÕÕ < “Õ. Thus, for ﬂ> 3, the maximum level of “ for which
expropriation is profitable withM = 3 is smaller than the corresponding level withM = 1.
Moreover, the negative e ect of an increase in “ on the expected payo  from targeting is
comparatively stronger for M = 3 than for M = 1: the ratio of the gross expected payo s
(gross of k) for M = 1 and M = 3 is increasing in “. So, bounded rationality makes the
coordination problem comparatively “more di cult” in the case M = 3 than it does in
the case M = 1.19
Appendix 2: Experiment chronology
We ran three sets of sessions (in chronological order):
Set 1 This implemented treatments PX, P and X, along with PX-Het, P-Het and
X-Het. The “institution” treatments (P, X, PX) were varied between sessions and
were also crossed with within-session treatments manipulating group heterogeneity
(PX vs. PX-Het etc.)
Set 2 This implemented treatments PX-History, PX-Noise and PX-Stranger, as
well as PX-History-Het, PX-Noise-Het and PX-Stranger-Het. The History, Noise
18The first term in brackets is the probability that i is the only individual actually to target j; the
second term is the probability that an individual other than i is mistakenly targeting j even when the
supposed target was jÕ ”= j, divided by two (the number of expropriators sharing the amount that is
expropriated); the third term is the probability that two other individuals mistakenly target j, divided
by three (the number of expropriators sharing the amount that is expropriated).
19The case M = 2 introduces the possibility of equilibria where individuals are targeted by two indi-
viduals as well as equilibria where one individual is targeted by three other individuals, depending on
the values ﬂ and “. A full theoretical characterization is possible but tedious, and does not add anything
of substance to the insights we can gain by comparing the cases M = 1 and M = 3. In our laboratory
experiments, we include treatments with M = 2, as well as treatments with M = 1 and M = 3.
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and Stranger treatments were per-session and were crossed with within-session treat-
ments manipulating group heterogeneity (PX-History vs. PX-History-Het etc.)
Set 3 This implemented treatments PX-M1, PX-M2 and PX-M3. Treatments were
balanced across groups within sessions.
Appendix 3: Additional results
Figure 4 shows expropriation by contribution status, for treatments PX-Hist-Het, PX-
Noise-Het and PX-Stranger-Het . Table 6 shows logit regressions where the dependent
variable is being expropriated, for treatments PX, PX-Hist, PX-Noise, PX-Stranger, com-
bined with their -Het variants. Non-lowest contributors are excluded, since they were
almost never expropriated (hence, N is lower than for Table 4).
PX PX-Hist PX-Noise PX-Stranger
Intercept ≠2.60úúú ≠3.08úúú ≠2.01úúú ≠2.90úúú
(0.36) (0.49) (0.39) (0.56)
Minority 2.28úúú 3.89úúú 2.69 2.35úúú
(0.55) (1.01) (1.79) (0.60)
-Het treatment ≠1.07 ≠0.70 ≠1.60 ≠0.12
(0.55) (1.06) (1.26) (0.69)
Unique lowest 2.94úúú 1.53úúú 0.86 2.47úúú
(0.43) (0.34) (0.49) (0.51)
Minority * unique lowest ≠2.72úúú ≠2.17 ≠9.03úúú ≠1.63úú
(0.78) (1.12) (1.78) (0.56)
-Het * unique lowest 0.47 0.31 1.17 0.06
(0.65) (1.24) (1.31) (0.70)
Num. obs. 805 322 326 912
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.27 0.08 0.24
L.R. 230.83 52.21 16.08 168.25
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05. Robust s.e.s clustered by group/matching group. Non-lowest contributors excluded.
Table 6: Logit regressions: logged odds of being expropriated
In Experiment 1 treatments, the coe cient onMinority is significant, but the summed
coe cient Minority + Minority * Unique lowest is not. Thus, minorities were only tar-
geted more when they were one of two or three equal lowest contributors in the group. In
Experiment 2, summed coe cients Minority + Minority * Unique lowest are significantly
positive in history and stranger sessions (p < 0.1 and p < 0.05 respectively), significantly
negative in noise sessions.
The decision to contribute is not exogenous. We check robustness by adding further
independent variables. Table 7 repeats the regressions, adding the individual’s contri-
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Figure 4: Proportion expropriated by minority status and contribution, treatments PX-
Hist-Het, PX-Noise-Het, PX-Stranger-Het
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bution, and whether they were expropriated in the previous round. These variables are
significant, but it remains true that unique lowest contributors and minorities are targeted.
Table 8 reports mean contributions for PX-History, -Noise and -Stranger treatments
and their -Het variants.
PX PX-Hist PX-Noise PX-Stranger
Intercept ≠3.66úúú ≠3.42úúú ≠2.09úúú ≠3.01úúú
(0.55) (0.45) (0.39) (0.61)
Minority 2.47úúú 2.89úú 2.49 2.24úúú
(0.58) (1.04) (1.66) (0.61)
-Het treatment ≠0.91 ≠0.51 ≠1.56 ≠0.10
(0.57) (1.05) (1.21) (0.68)
Unique lowest 3.23úúú 1.10úú 0.77 2.48úúú
(0.52) (0.36) (0.51) (0.54)
Contribution 0.04úúú 0.05ú 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Lag exprop. 1.18úúú 2.48úúú 0.66 0.81úúú
(0.31) (0.55) (0.41) (0.24)
Minority * unique lowest ≠2.69úúú ≠1.48 ≠8.79úúú ≠1.60úú
(0.78) (1.25) (1.65) (0.54)
-Het * unique lowest 0.41 0.15 1.23 0.04
(0.68) (1.28) (1.31) (0.70)
Num. obs. 805 322 326 912
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.41 0.09 0.26
L.R. 277.60 81.37 18.38 180.62
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05. Robust s.e.s clustered by group/matching group. Non-lowest contributors excluded.
Table 7: Logit regressions: logged odds of being expropriated, extra controls
PX-Hist PX-Noise PX-Stranger
Homogenous 9.75 17.39 16.22
Heterogenous 14.14 17.38 15.08
Mann-Whitney p 0.24 0.52 0.93
Table 8: Contributions by treatment
32
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